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P r é c i s
N’importe quelle taxe d’affaires comporte nécessairement pour les petites entreprises 
des frais d’observation plus élevés tandis que les administrations fiscales doivent 
engager des frais administratifs plus élevés pour ces petites entreprises, tout en tirant 
d’elles de faibles recettes fiscales nettes. En réaction à cette situation, de nombreux pays 
qui lèvent une taxe à valeur ajoutée (tva) adoptent un seuil d’enregistrement pour 
soustraire du régime de tva les petites entreprises pour lesquelles le fardeau de 
l’observation serait le plus onéreux, et fixe ce seuil à un niveau qui ne nuit pas beaucoup 
aux recettes de tva. Cependant, la distinction créée par le seuil entre les entreprises 
exclues du régime de tva et celles qui y sont entièrement intégrées donne lieu à des 
distorsions de concurrence; ces distorsions diminuent pour certaines entreprises 
lorsqu’elles choisissent volontairement de s’enregistrer, tandis qu’elles incitent certaines 
autres entreprises à adopter un comportement qui leur permettra de rester sous le seuil 
d’enregistrement. Qu’il soit sous la forme de contraintes commerciales, de division 
d’entreprise ou de sous-déclaration des revenus, ce comportement entraîne de plus 
amples distorsions et menace le recouvrement des recettes. Cet article examine les 
principaux défis et considérations dans l’établissement d’un seuil d’enregistrement de la 
tva et les conséquences de l’adoption de ce seuil.
Deux questions liées au choix du seuil se rapportent à l’utilisation par certains pays 
de régimes transitoires de subvention pour réduire la discontinuité fiscale pendant que 
les entreprises passent au plein régime de tva, et à l’utilisation par d’autres pays de 
régimes spéciaux de concession pour réduire le fardeau de l’observation des petites 
entreprises lorsqu’elles sont assujetties à la tva. D’autres pays choisissent d’utiliser une 
frontière entre deux régimes différents, mais voisins, plutôt qu’un seuil 
d’enregistrement. Dans ce genre de régime, les entreprises qui sont au-dessus de la 
frontière sont assujetties au plein montant de tva, et les petites entreprises qui sont sous 
la frontière paient une taxe sur le chiffre d’affaires. La taxe sur le chiffre d’affaires est 
parfois présentée comme un régime visant la simplification, parfois l’accroissement des 
recettes. Il se peut que les avantages des régimes de simplification et de transition 
soient exagérés, et que l’on ne reconnaisse pas suffisamment les coûts et les distorsions 
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qui en découlent. Un examen de ces régimes sera utile aux décideurs politiques qui 
envisagent de réformer leur régime ou d’en adopter un nouveau.
A b s t r A c t
Inherent features of any business tax are the imposition of relatively higher compliance 
costs on small businesses and higher administrative costs faced by tax authorities in 
respect of these firms, allied with low net tax revenue collected from the sector. a 
common response in jurisdictions levying a value-added tax (vat) is the adoption of a 
registration threshold to remove from the formal vat system small businesses for which 
the compliance burden would be most onerous, with the threshold being set at a level 
that does not seriously undermine vat revenue. However, the distinction caused by the 
threshold between enterprises excluded from the vat and others fully incorporated into 
the tax system gives rise to competitive distortions; these distortions are ameliorated for 
some businesses through a voluntary registration option, while other businesses are 
induced to adopt behaviour that will allow them to remain below the registration 
threshold. taking the form of commercial restraint, enterprise splitting, or underreporting 
of sales, this behaviour leads to further distortions and threatens revenue collection. 
this article reviews the key considerations and challenges in setting a vat registration 
threshold and the consequences of adopting that boundary.
two issues related to the choice of threshold concern the use of “transitioning” 
subsidy regimes adopted in some jurisdictions to reduce the tax discontinuity as 
enterprises move into the full vat system and the special concessional regimes used in 
some countries to reduce the compliance burden that small businesses face once they 
are subject to vat. another approach found in some jurisdictions is the use of a tax 
regime border instead of a registration threshold, with a full vat being levied on 
enterprises above the border and a substitute turnover (revenue) tax being imposed on 
small businesses below the border. the turnover tax alternative has been variously 
explained as a system intended to achieve simplification or revenue-raising objectives. 
the benefits of the transitioning and simplification schemes may be exaggerated, while 
their unintended costs and distortions may be insufficiently recognized. a review of 
these systems can provide guidance to policy makers contemplating reform or the 
adoption of new regimes.
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introduction
Two features common to most value-added tax (vaT) and goods and services tax 
(gST)1 systems are the use of a registration threshold, usually based on annual turn-
over (business revenue),2 to determine when businesses are subject to the tax, and 
one or more small business regimes that provide specific tax rules for small busi-
nesses that have crossed the registration threshold or that sit below the threshold. 
The common (but not universal) support for adoption of a registration threshold 
does not extend to the level at which it should be set. among members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in 2016 regis-
tration threshold levels ranged from £83,000 (approximately Cdn$ 148,708) in the 
United Kingdom to zero in Spain, Turkey, Chile, and Mexico.3 Other countries are 
widely scattered between the two extremes, with most of them having a registration 
threshold far lower than that of the United Kingdom. The threshold for Canada’s 
gST/hST (harmonized sales tax) system, for example, is an intermediate amount of 
Cdn $30,000.4 as is the case with the registration threshold, there is no unanimity 
on the rules for small businesses.
The primary purpose of a registration threshold is to reduce administrative and 
compliance costs; study after study shows that the administrative costs incurred by 
tax authorities to apply the vaT to small businesses and the compliance costs 
incurred by small businesses are disproportionate to the revenue that these enter-
prises generate. The registration threshold has the effect of omitting the smallest 
businesses from the formal vaT system. generally, a bright-line test is used to 
determine when an enterprise has reached the registration threshold, though in 
some cases evidence of sustained turnover above the threshold is required.5 Busi-
nesses with turnovers below the registration threshold are not, however, fully 
outside the scope of the vaT. although they are not required to register for or remit 
 1 In this article, the term “vaT” is used to describe the tax broadly labelled the value added tax 
and the goods and services tax, as it is known in Canada and a few other anglophone 
jurisdictions, as well as India and Malaysia.
 2 In some instances, however, there are alternative measurements of the threshold. For example, 
in the Netherlands, the thresholds are calculated by reference to net annual vaT due. While 
“turnover” is commonly used in gST and vaT laws, Canadian law prescribes a somewhat 
circuitous path to registration. all persons making taxable supplies in Canada are required to 
register, unless the person is a “small supplier.” The definition of small supplier refers to 
consideration received for supplies.
 3 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Consumption Tax Trends 2016: 
VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Policy Issues (Paris: OECD, 2016), at 89.
 4 The general rule is subject to exceptions with separate thresholds for public service bodies, at 
$50,000, and charities or public institutions, at $250,000. In addition, taxi drivers, including 
Uber drivers, are required to register for and remit gST/hST regardless of their turnover.
 5 For example, an exemption threshold in the French vaT allows businesses that cross the 
threshold to retain the exemption for up to two years provided that their turnover does not 
exceed €90,300 (for sales) or €34,900 (for services) for more than a year during this period.
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vaT, unregistered firms bear vaT on their inputs, and this cost becomes incorpor-
ated into their selling prices.
Thresholds raise two concerns. The first is competitive distortion. a threshold 
that creates differences in terms of tax payments and compliance costs for businesses 
above and below the registration borderline appears to affect the relative competi-
tive positions of the firms.6 Many countries allow businesses with turnovers below 
the threshold to voluntarily register for the vaT in order to mitigate this problem 
where unregistered businesses would be prejudiced by their exclusion from the vaT 
system.
a second and more significant concern is the possible economic and revenue cost 
of business behaviour aimed at keeping the enterprise below the registration thresh-
old. The observed bunching of small businesses below the registration threshold 
may be the result of three types of business behaviour: dishonesty and failure to 
report some sales, artificial separation of a business into multiple unregistered parts, 
and reduction of activity to reduce sales. Underreporting of sales and business 
splitting lead to revenue losses, while business restraint causes economic harm of 
particular concern to policy makers. One way of mitigating these problems is to 
reduce the double shock of compliance costs and higher tax faced by businesses 
entering the vaT system. Some jurisdictions have adopted “transitioning” rules that 
provide subsidies to offset the costs and tax for businesses crossing the registration 
threshold.
While adoption of a threshold can mitigate the burden of comparatively high 
compliance costs faced by small businesses, it cannot eliminate the problem if some 
small businesses remain above the threshold. The adoption of simplified vaT pro-
cedural rules for small businesses to address the disproportionate compliance costs 
borne by these enterprises is not uncommon. Measures incorporated into simplified 
regimes include less frequent filing (and, often, less frequent payments) and cash 
basis accounting. a variation allows eligible small businesses with turnovers exceed-
ing the threshold to use a single presumptive input tax entitlement calculation in 
lieu of tracking all acquisitions to determine total entitlements.
Separately, instead of using a registration threshold that excludes the smallest 
businesses entirely from the indirect tax system, some jurisdictions adopt a turnover 
border that distinguishes businesses subject to the full vaT and those subject to an 
alternative lower-rate turnover tax.
Registration thresholds and small business regimes work in tandem, and the 
absence or presence of a simplified regime will have an impact on the full vaT regis-
tration point and vice versa. however, the interaction is complex. as explained 
further below, regimes that reduce compliance costs for small businesses in the 
formal vaT system may make lower thresholds feasible, but the reduced threshold 
will lead to higher administrative costs with little offsetting revenue. also affecting 
the threshold level is the choice of treatment of small businesses outside the formal 
 6 Liam P. Ebrill, Michael Keen, Jean-Paul Bodin, and victoria J. Perry, The Modern VAT 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2001), at 119-21.
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vaT. as a general rule, higher-income jurisdictions favour input taxation (that is, no 
recovery of input tax, leaving businesses to bear the burden of the tax in the first 
instance) for smaller businesses below a registration threshold. The approach taken 
by medium- and lower-income jurisdictions is less consistent. Some subject small 
businesses with turnovers below the registration threshold to input taxation, while 
others have substituted alternative tax borders for registration thresholds and impose 
a lower-rate turnover tax on businesses below this boundary.
The lack of agreement on registration threshold levels does not reflect the 
absence of any theoretical framework for policy development in this area. Rather, 
it reflects the dearth of clear practical guidance in current theoretical analysis of the 
issue and the impact of exogenous factors on vaT design. Country-specific factors 
and domestic political considerations play crucial roles in tax design, and there is 
thus no one-size solution that can address all these issues. In the case of small 
business regimes, policy makers must address the design issues, for the most part, 
without the benefit of any theoretical discussion to provide guidance or a concep-
tual framework on the subject.
It is nevertheless possible to identify the issues that should be taken into account 
when policy makers consider where the registration threshold should be set, whether 
simplified and phasing-in regimes should be available for small businesses that have 
crossed the registration threshold, and whether alternative small business regimes 
should be adopted for businesses below the threshold at which they are required to 
register for the full vaT. an analysis of these issues can set the stage for the develop-
ment of sorely needed practical guidance.
bAlAncing revenue needs AgAinst 
AdministrAtive  And comPliAnce costs
In principle, a neutral vaT will apply to all types of supplies made by all categories 
of suppliers. The general principle, however, neglects the uneven distribution of 
administrative and compliance costs and tax revenue across different sizes of busi-
nesses. Small businesses constitute a large proportion of registered persons but 
contribute only a small proportion of vaT revenue. The sheer number of small 
enterprises in the vaT system means that administrative resources devoted to the 
group are necessarily high even as the revenue collected from them is low. at the same 
time, compliance costs borne by the group are disproportionally high as a percent-
age of turnover compared to the relative cost of compliance for larger firms.
In most countries, a large share of vaT revenue is collected from an exception-
ally small number of registrants with the highest turnovers. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, in 2010-11 half of the total vaT revenue was paid by only 0.4 percent 
of vaT-registered businesses, and 10 percent of the vaT registrants contributed 
83 percent of the total vaT revenue (see figure 1).7
 7 United Kingdom, hM Revenue & Customs, “value added Tax Factsheet,” November 22, 
2011, at section 2.2.
314  n  canadian tax journal / revue fiscale canadienne (2018) 66:2
administrative efforts, however, are primarily devoted to the large group of 
small businesses that generate little net tax revenue. While overall vaT administra-
tive costs are sensitive to two main factors—the complexity of the tax (the use of 
reduced or zero rates and exemptions) and the number of vaT registrants8—those 
costs do not fall proportionately on small and large businesses. In the United 
Kingdom, more than half of the cost of administering the vaT can be attributed to 
the administration of the smallest businesses that account for the bulk of taxable 
persons and a tiny fraction of vaT revenue collected.9 a US study considering the 
implications of adopting a vaT in that country estimated that removal of smaller 
businesses from the vaT to reduce the number of registrants by more than half 
FIGURE 1 Distribution of Net Value-Added Tax (VAT) Revenue by Turnover Groups 
in the United Kingdom, 2010-11
Source: United Kingdom, HM Revenue & Customs, “Value Added Tax Factsheet,” 
November 22, 2011.
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 8 Sijbren Cnossen, “administrative and Compliance Costs of the vaT: a Review of the 
Evidence” (1994) 63:12 Tax Notes 1609-26.
 9 In a study looking at the 1977-78 fiscal year in the United Kingdom, Sandford estimated that 
55 percent of administrative resources were allocated to 69 percent of registered businesses 
(under £50,000 turnover) from which less than 5 percent of revenue was collected; see Cedric 
Sandford, Michael godwin, Peter hardwick, and Michael Butterworth, Costs and Benefits of 
VAT (London: heinemann, 1981), and Cedric Sandford, “The administrative and Compliance 
Costs of Taxation: Lessons from the United Kingdom” (1985) 15:3 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 199-205.
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could reduce administrative costs by one-third while reducing revenue collection by 
only 3 percent.10
Compliance costs borne by registered persons may be of even greater concern 
than administrative costs borne by the tax authority, given that compliance costs 
appear to be much higher.11 There is, to be sure, a risk that measurements of com-
pliance costs are vulnerable to overestimation and might be subject to a wider 
margin of error than estimates of administrative costs.12 For example, it is difficult 
for businesses, in particular small businesses, to separate vaT compliance costs from 
the cost of basic record-keeping and accounting activities that would be incurred in 
any case in the process of running the business or meeting income tax obligations.13 
also, empirical studies on compliance costs conducted in previous decades must 
now be read with caution, taking into account the impact that technological 
advances in accounting and record keeping have had on compliance costs.14
Notwithstanding these caveats, it is clear that compliance costs fall dispropor-
tionately on small businesses.15 In one study, compliance costs as a percentage of 
turnover were estimated to be more than 30 times greater for small businesses than 
for large firms.16 These heavy and disproportionate compliance burdens on small 
businesses raise equity concerns,17 in particular in countries where policies tend to 
favour small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
In terms of both administrative and compliance costs, small businesses thus pres-
ent a special case in the vaT. From an efficient tax design perspective, even more 
important than the absolute cost of small business administration and compliance is 
its magnitude relative to the revenue collected from these enterprises.18 as discussed 
 10 United States, general accounting Office, Value-Added Tax: Administrative Costs Vary with 
Complexity and Number of Businesses, gaO/ggD-93-78 (Washington, DC: general accounting 
Office, May 1993).
 11 Sandford, “administrative and Compliance Costs,” supra note 9, at 201.
 12 Cnossen, supra note 8, at 1610.
 13 Ibid.; and United Kingdom, house of Commons Treasury Committee, The Administrative Costs 
of Tax Compliance, Seventh Report of Session 2003-04 (London: Stationery Office, June 2004).
 14 Cnossen, supra note 8, at 1610. as early as 1993, a Canadian study showed that gST 
compliance costs for businesses that used computerized accounting systems were 20 percent to 
40 percent lower than the costs for businesses that used manual accounting systems; see 
Plamondon & associates, GST Compliance Costs for Small Business in Canada: A Study for the 
Department of Finance, Tax Policy (Ottawa: Department of Finance, December 1993).
 15 Cedric Sandford, Michael godwin, and Peter hardwick, Administrative and Compliance Costs of 
Taxation (Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1989); Cedric Sandford and John hasseldine, The 
Compliance Costs of Business Taxes in New Zealand (Wellington: victoria University of 
Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, 1992); and Plamondon & associates, supra note 14.
 16 The study looked at the 1977-78 fiscal year: see Sandford, “administrative and Compliance 
Costs,” supra note 9, at 201.
 17 Cnossen, supra note 8, at 1619.
 18 Michelle Salvail, The Goods and Services Tax: The Government’s Administration Costs (Ottawa: 
Library of Parliament, Parliamentary Research Branch, Economics Division, February 1994).
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above, revenue authorities devote significant resources to apply the vaT to small 
businesses, and these businesses in turn incur relatively high costs to comply with 
the law, with little net tax revenue to show for all these outgoings. In fact, the total 
administrative costs incurred to collect tax from small businesses and compliance 
costs incurred by small businesses in respect of calculating and paying the tax may 
well outweigh the vaT revenue generated by this group of enterprises.19
The response in most countries to the high costs and limited revenue associated 
with the application of the vaT to small businesses has been the adoption of a regis-
tration threshold to exclude a portion of small businesses from the vaT system. This 
approach allows revenue authorities to concentrate scarce administrative resources 
on larger taxpayers and relieves small businesses outside the system from the burden 
of vaT compliance. While the outcome seems not to be fully appreciated by juris-
dictions with relatively low thresholds, the revenue loss resulting from even high 
thresholds is unlikely to be significant. With no entitlements to input tax credits, 
firms below the threshold are still taxed on inputs; only their final value added 
escapes additional taxation.
Focusing on the tradeoff between revenue and administrative and compliance 
costs, Keen and Mintz developed a simple theoretical rule that the optimal threshold 
should be set at the level where the marginal revenue gains from bringing more 
taxpayers into the vaT equals the additional administrative and compliance costs.20 
The application of the rule has proved to be more complex in practice since a host 
of other factors also affect the choice of threshold, leading to thresholds either 
above or very often below the optimal threshold to which the Keen and Mintz 
approach would point.21
a strict balance between revenue and collection costs also provides a case for a 
lower threshold for sectors with higher value-added-to-sales ratios.22 a few countries 
(for example, Ireland and France) apply differentiated thresholds for goods and 
services.23 They are, however, unlikely to be models for other countries because of 
the practical difficulties of distinguishing between goods and services, in particular 
for registered persons that provide mixed supplies.24 Differentiated thresholds 
increase administrative and compliance costs, compromising some of the benefit of 
adopting a threshold in the first place.
 19 Sandford and hasseldine, supra note 15, at 120; and Ebrill et al., supra note 6, at 117.
 20 Michael Keen and Jack Mintz, “The Optimal Threshold for a value-added Tax” (2004) 88:3-4 
Journal of Public Economics 559-76.
 21 For example, most of the member states in the European Union have a threshold that is lower 
than the theoretically optimal threshold: see Institute for Fiscal Studies, A Retrospective 
Evaluation of Elements of the EU VAT System: Final Report (London: IFS, December 2011), at 83.
 22 Ebrill et al., supra note 6, at 119; and Keen and Mintz, supra note 20, at 563.
 23 Keen and Mintz, supra note 20, at 563.
 24 alan Carter, ed., International Tax Dialogue: Key Issues and Debates in VAT, SME Taxation and the 
Tax Treatment of the Financial Sector (Paris: OECD, International Tax Dialogue, 2013).
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an optimal threshold that balances revenue against administrative and compliance 
costs is inherently transitory. In theory, the threshold should shift downward—for 
example, if administrative costs fall as capacity grows with experience, and compliance 
costs decrease with advances in technology. at the same time, inflation will cause 
the nominal turnovers of businesses to rise while their economic size and capacities 
remain constant, suggesting that a rising threshold is appropriate. The United 
Kingdom and Canada represent examples of opposing practice. The vaT threshold 
in the United Kingdom has typically been increased annually in line with inflation, 
leaving the current threshold level in nominal terms at 16.6 times that used when 
the vaT came into effect in 1973. In contrast, Canada has never changed its thresh-
old since the gST was introduced in 1991. Between these extremes lie countries 
with ad hoc threshold lifts.25
a system of continual adjustments such as that used in the United Kingdom 
appears to disregard the likelihood of reductions in administrative and compliance 
costs over time, while the effective reduction of the threshold in real terms experi-
enced in Canada brings ever smaller businesses facing relatively higher compliance 
burdens into the system. a more sensible approach would be to periodically review 
and adjust the threshold to balance changes in the real value of money and changes 
in administrative and compliance costs.
threshold-relAted distortions And 
inefficiencies
a registration threshold can mitigate the relatively high compliance costs that would 
be faced by small businesses and the disproportionate collection costs that would be 
borne by revenue authorities if all enterprises were subject to the vaT. Provided that 
the threshold is set at an appropriate level, these benefits can be achieved with a 
minimal cost to revenue. however, there might also be economic costs resulting 
from the adoption of a threshold. The omission of some small businesses from the 
formal vaT system creates a break in the vaT chain if small unregistered businesses 
buy from or sell to registered businesses. This break may deny revenue authorities 
a source of information that is useful for assessment and audit purposes. In addition, 
the inability of small businesses to issue tax invoices could lead to a cascading 
problem since unrecovered vaT will become another cost of acquisition for other 
businesses that buy from unregistered firms. Most importantly, the differential 
treatment of firms above and below the threshold in terms of tax payments and 
compliance burdens may give rise to costly distortions to the competitive positions 
of registered and unregistered businesses making otherwise comparable supplies, 
and may induce inefficient changes in business behaviour that cause further eco-
nomic harm or lead to revenue losses. Policy responses to these problems could in 
turn yield new problems and distortions.
 25 For example, the registration threshold in New Zealand was increased by 50 percent in 2009 in 
response to the global financial crisis.
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Distortion of Competition
a registration threshold drives a wedge between businesses that are in the vaT 
system and businesses that are excluded from the formal vaT system and are instead 
subject to input taxation. It is a given that greatly different tax treatment of two 
groups of enterprises operating within the same market will result in competitive 
distortions, but identifying the precise types and levels of distortions and devising 
responses to mitigate the negative impact of the distortions have proved difficult. 
Some firms left outside the vaT by a registration threshold enjoy benefits from 
exclusion while others are prejudiced by it.
On the apparent plus side of the advantage-disadvantage scale are small busi-
nesses that sell to final consumers.26 Firms that have lower inputs relative to outputs 
and sell primarily to final consumers are likely to enjoy competitive advantages from 
being input-taxed only, with their value added escaping tax. This competitive 
advantage will increase as the proportion of the final price attributable to a firm’s 
value added rises.
The claimed competitive advantages in this respect may not, however, be a real-
world problem, for two reasons. First, although small firms below the threshold 
may enjoy tax advantages, their prices at the retail stage may still be higher than 
those of larger firms that are able to reduce costs by exploiting proprietary informa-
tion and enjoying economies of scale.27 Second, to the extent that the economic 
positions of firms just above and below the threshold are largely similar, the advan-
tages and disadvantages are only a temporary phenomenon, since business sizes are 
not static. On the one hand, some small businesses below the threshold may grow 
larger and cross the threshold. On the other hand, where firms just above the 
threshold are disadvantaged, their turnovers may fall below the threshold owing to 
a reduction in sales volumes or profit margins.
While the perceived benefits of escaping the full vaT may prove illusory for 
some enterprises, two types of small firms below the threshold may be disadvan-
taged relative to firms subject to the vaT. The first type comprises businesses that 
seek to make supplies to registered businesses. Small firms below the threshold are 
unable to issue invoices that entitle registered purchasers to input tax credits. Regis-
tered businesses will thus be reluctant to purchase from unregistered firms. The 
second group consists of enterprises from registered businesses with high input costs 
relative to taxable output sales. Examples include new businesses that incur startup 
costs that initially exceed turnover and businesses that make zero-rated export sales. 
These firms might be entitled to vaT refunds if they were within the vaT system.
To minimize the competitive disadvantage that these firms may face, many coun-
tries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Canada, allow voluntary 
registration by small firms with turnovers below the threshold. The option for 
 26 Ebrill et al., supra note 6, at 120.
 27 a similar argument was made in Ebrill et al., ibid.
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voluntary registration, which removes the compliance and administrative cost 
savings that flow from the registration threshold, has markedly different implica-
tions for enterprises choosing to enter the tax net and revenue agencies responsible 
for administering the tax. Since the former group is voluntarily incurring higher 
compliance costs, it must be assumed that these firms believe that they will enjoy an 
overall economic benefit from registration after incurring new compliance costs; 
otherwise, they would not have elected to enter the vaT regime. In contrast, from 
a tax collection perspective, the result may be reduced revenue and disproportion-
ately high administrative costs.
voluntary registrations may constitute a relatively high percentage of total 
registrations; in several OECD countries, well over one-third of total vaT registrants 
are voluntary registrants.28 For example, in the United Kingdom in 2016-17, 
46 percent of the businesses registered for the vaT operated below the threshold.29 
Tax statistics in New Zealand show even higher percentages of voluntary registra-
tion in most years, ranging from a low of 45 percent to a high of 52 percent of total 
registrants during the period 2009-2016.30 as a consequence of the self-selection 
nature of voluntary registration, this group is likely to be disproportionately popu-
lated by persons claiming refunds from the revenue authority rather than those 
paying net tax to the government. In the United Kingdom and New Zealand, for 
example, a sizable proportion of voluntary registrants reported nil output sales 
(about 25 percent and 37 percent respectively), and in both jurisdictions, vaT receipts 
from firms at the bottom of the turnover scale are negative.31 In 2015-16, voluntary 
registrants in New Zealand collectively claimed a net vaT refund of NZ $656.5 million 
(approximately Cdn $573.72 million), a figure equal to 4 percent of the net vaT 
revenue collected.
The self-selection character of voluntary registration also has significant impli-
cations for vaT administrative costs. voluntary registration exacerbates considerably 
the disproportionate cost of administration relative to revenue that is a feature of the 
imposition of vaT on low-turnover enterprises. Disproportionately high adminis-
trative costs follow two aspects of voluntary registration. First, there is the increased 
risk of refund-related avoidance schemes and outright fraudulent claims for refunds. 
Refund requests must be vetted carefully, drawing costly additional administrative 
 28 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Taxation of SMEs: Key Issues and 
Policy Considerations (Paris: OECD, 2009). In 2003-4, over 34 percent of all gST/hST 
registrants in Canada had registered voluntarily. See Canada Revenue agency, Compendium of 
GST/HST Statistics: 2004 Edition (2002 tax year) (Ottawa: CRa, 2004), at table 6.
 29 United Kingdom, hM Revenue & Customs, “value added Tax (vaT) Factsheet 2016-17,” 
October 31, 2017, at section 2.7.
 30 New Zealand Inland Revenue, “Number of gST Filers by Turnover Band 2007 to 2016,” 
October 27, 2017.
 31 hM Revenue & Customs, supra note 29, at section 2.7; and New Zealand Inland Revenue, 
“Net gST by Turnover Band 2007 to 2016,” October 27, 2017.
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resources.32 Second, voluntary registration opens the door to whipsaw behaviour 
by firms that register to claim input tax credits related to startup costs and then 
deregister if ongoing business activities yield turnovers below the registration 
threshold.33 It is not uncommon for jurisdictions to require voluntary registrants to 
remain registered for a minimum period of time (commonly between one and 
five years)34 in order to discourage whipsaw behaviour. however, the limited vaT 
that may be collected from these firms in the compulsory registration period does 
little to offset the high administrative costs incurred in respect of these registrants that 
are responsible for negative vaT remittances for much of that period. an alternative, 
such as that used in Canada and australia to address the risk of whipsaw behaviour 
while avoiding ongoing administrative costs, is to adopt a relatively short minimum 
registration period but effectively recapture input tax credits on deregistration.35
as noted, in theory the optimal registration threshold would be set at the level 
where the marginal revenue gains from bringing more taxpayers into the vaT equal 
the increased administrative and compliance costs resulting from the additional 
registrations. however, the theoretical model disregards the impact on revenue and 
collection costs of voluntary registration. These costs must affect the choice of 
threshold level. The revenue yield from voluntary registrants below the threshold 
is likely to be less, and quite probably substantially less, than if the registration 
threshold were simply lowered to bring the same number of businesses into the vaT 
system. at the same time, the increased administrative costs incurred in respect of 
voluntary registrants will increase revenue needs. The task of recomputing the 
tradeoff between revenue and collection costs to take into account the potential 
impact of voluntary registration becomes a multilayered undertaking.
There is, however, little evidence of careful consideration of the impact of vol-
untary registration on the optimal threshold level. While small businesses may seek 
to register voluntarily for a number of reasons, including trade with registered busi-
nesses and market benefits from appearing larger than is actually the case,36 there 
are few comprehensive studies of the relative weighting of different factors inducing 
 32 Edith Brashares, Matthew Knittel, gerald Silverstein, and alexander Yuskavage, “Calculating 
the Optimal Small Business Exemption Threshold for a U.S. vaT” (2014) 67:2 National Tax 
Journal 283-320.
 33 OECD, supra note 3, at 75.
 34 For example, the minimum registration period is one year in Canada and australia, two years 
in Denmark and France, and five years in austria and germany. There is no minimum 
registration period requirement in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. See OECD, supra 
note 3, at 75 and 89.
 35 For the Canadian rule, see the Excise Tax act, RSC 1985, c. E-15, as amended, subsection 
171(3); for the australian rule, see a New Tax System (goods and Services Tax) act 1999, as 
amended, section 138.5.
 36 United Kingdom, Office of Tax Simplification, Value Added Tax: Routes to Simplification 
(London: Office of Tax Simplification, November 2017), at 18.
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voluntary registration.37 It is also unclear how voluntary registration rates would 
change if registration thresholds were raised or lowered. Cross-country compari-
sons reveal no discernible relationship between threshold levels and the rate of 
voluntary registration.38 For example, although the threshold is significantly lower 
in New Zealand (in 2015-16, NZ $ 60,000, equivalent to approximately Cdn $ 52,425) 
than in the United Kingdom (£82,000 in 2015-16, or approximately Cdn $ 146,056), 
the voluntary registration rate in New Zealand appears to be higher (see tables 1 
and 2). at the same time, Japan, with a relatively high registration threshold 
(approximately Cdn $113,987), has a voluntary registration rate that is less than 1 ⁄ 10 
of the UK rate.39 The comparisons must be read with extreme caution, however, 
given the fact that the nominal monetary value of thresholds may differ substan-
tially from the actual purchasing power parity value.
In-country comparisons also yield inconsistent results. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the voluntary registration rate has remained largely static in the past 
10 years, although the registration threshold has been raised annually (see table 1). 
at the same time, following invitations from the tax authority to deregister when 
registration thresholds were raised twice in each of 1977 and 1978, only 1 ⁄ 5 of the 
taxpayers who were newly eligible for deregistration opted to move outside the vaT 
system.40 In contrast, in New Zealand, where there were no changes in the thresh-
old between 2009-10 and 2015-16, the voluntary registration rate declined by about 
1 percent each year (see table 2).
Policy makers seeking to calibrate the registration threshold in light of the impact 
of voluntary registration on revenue and costs thus face a quandary. On the one hand, 
they may realize that voluntary registration will affect tax revenue and tax collection 
costs, but they have no means of ascertaining the actual effects of voluntary regis-
tration. On the other hand, they may appreciate that changes to the registration 
threshold can influence the rate of voluntary registration, without having any means 
of estimating the direction in which voluntary registrations may head or the degree 
to which the level might change.
These challenges may go some way toward explaining why vaT theorists most 
often ignore the question of voluntary registration when discussing an optimal 
registration threshold. Wherever the threshold is otherwise set, adoption of a vol-
untary registration option to assist businesses with turnovers below the threshold 
 37 a recent UK study sought to rank factors using subjective data gathered from interviews with a 
limited sample of small businesses, but the findings are difficult to reconcile with hMRC data 
based on all taxable persons. See Rebecca Klahr, Lucy Joyce, Rory Donaldson, graham Keilloh, 
and Cheryl Salmon, Behaviours and Experience in Relation to VAT Registration: Final Report, 
hM Revenue and Customs Research Report no. 446 (London: hM Revenue and Customs, 
November 2017).
 38 Brashares et al., supra note 32, at 287.
 39 OECD, supra note 28, at 122.
 40 United Kingdom, hM Customs and Excise, Review of Value Added Tax, Cmnd 7415 (London: 
hM Customs and Excise, 1978), at 12-13.
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removes the downside of a registration threshold for enterprises that must be in the 
vaT system for commercial reasons.41 however, as soon as voluntary registration is 
contemplated, its impact on revenue and administrative costs must be factored back 
into the equation used to identify the optimal threshold. While exact calculations 
may not be possible, an effective revenue service should be able to generate sufficient 
information for authorities to take the probable effects of voluntary registration 
into account when setting the registration threshold.
Behavioural Responses to a Threshold
Not surprisingly, the sharp rise in tax liability and compliance costs for firms that 
cross the registration turnover threshold prompts behavioural responses by firms 
enjoying the advantages of sitting outside the formal vaT system. Coexisting with 
the vaT registration threshold is the phenomenon of business bunching, with a 
large number of businesses reporting turnover just below the threshold level that 
would require vaT registration. a registration threshold thus creates a cliff-edge: a 
sharp increase in the number of businesses falling into the first turnover band below 
the threshold compared to the number in the second band below the threshold, 
matched by a drop to a much smaller number of businesses in the first turnover 
band above the threshold.42 Figure 2 illustrates this pattern based on UK data for 
2014-15. Unlike the vaT, the income tax generally has no registration threshold, 
and income tax data in some countries provide unambiguous evidence of small busi-
nesses bunching below the vaT registration threshold.43 Businesses that are 
registered for vaT purposes but that qualify for particularly generous small business 
concessions or beneficial regimes within the vaT are equally likely to adopt behav-
iours to ensure that turnovers stay below the threshold at which the concessions are 
withdrawn.44
 41 For those who do not believe that the removal of commercial disadvantage should be a priority, 
the case for allowing voluntary registration may be overwhelmed by the disproportionate value 
of administrative costs relative to tax revenue collected from small businesses; see William J. 
Turnier, “Designing an Efficient value added Tax” (1984) 39:4 Tax Law Review 435-72, at 
458-60.
 42 Office of Tax Simplification, supra note 36, at 6.
 43 See Li Liu and Ben Lockwood, VAT Notches, Voluntary Registration and Bunching: Theory and UK 
Evidence, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper WP 16/10 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, July 2016); and Jarkko harju, Tuomas 
Matikka, and Timo Rauhanen, The Effects of Size-Based Regulation on Small Firms: Evidence from 
VAT Threshold, vaTT Working Paper no. 75 (helsinki: vaTT Institute for Economic 
Research, 2016).
 44 a clear example of behaviour related to concessions for registered small businesses can be 
found in Japan, where concessions included generous tax credits; see Kazuki Onji, “The 
Response of Firms to Eligibility Thresholds: Evidence from the Japanese value-added Tax” 
(2009) 93:5-6 Journal of Public Economics 766-75. The Japanese concessional regime is described 
in Justin Dabner, “The Japanese Consumption Tax Experience: Lessons for australia?” (2002) 
5:2 Journal of Australian Taxation 185-212; and vicki Beyer and Koji Ishimura, “The Progress 
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Businesses seeking to stay below the registration threshold may adopt one or 
more of three tactics:
 1. deliberately holding back expansion in order to remain input-taxed suppliers;
 2. splitting enterprises with total turnover above the threshold into smaller 
separate entities, each of which has a turnover below the threshold; or
 3. fraudulently underreporting sales where actual turnover is above the 
threshold.
These behaviours impose economic costs on the community or lead to lost revenue, 
though their impact varies. While the empirical studies successfully document the 
FIGURE 2 Number of Entities by Turnover Band in the United Kingdom, 2014-15
Source: United Kingdom, Office of Tax Simplification, Value Added Tax: Routes to Simplification 
(London: Office of Tax Simplification, November 2017), at 7.
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of the Japanese National Consumption Tax” (1993) 3:2 Revenue Law Journal 115-24. More 
recently, the UK revenue authority uncovered a scheme to split a single enterprise into 
hundreds of mini-companies, each of which would be able to use a concessional presumptive 
input tax credit regime; see Simon goodley, “Recruitment advisers’ Tax Scheme Liquidated 
after hMRC asks Questions,” Guardian, July 10, 2017 (https://amp.theguardian.com/
business/2017/jul/10/tax-scheme-anderson-group).
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existence of bunching,45 findings are often ambiguous in terms of identifying 
the extent to which each tactic is used. a UK study attributes bunching largely to 
output restraint and underreporting,46 while case-law evidence in the United King-
dom points to splitting as a factor as well. a Finnish study suggests that restraint is 
the main cause of bunching in that country,47 but the methodology employed in the 
study to dismiss splitting as a tactic is problematic. a later UK study based on a 
telephone survey of a limited pool of businesses, not surprisingly, downplayed 
significantly the role of underreporting and artificial splitting.48 The limited and 
completely subjective data set, however, makes reliance on the findings vulnerable 
to challenge.49 In any case, uncertainty as to the prevalence of each tactic com-
pounds the difficulty of devising effective responses.
Much of the emphasis in the academic literature and in policy discussions is on 
the first tactic, with concern that restrained production will result in “significant 
efficiency losses”50 from underutilization of resources and reductions in potential 
outputs.51 Businesses may decide to restrain outputs and remain below the registra-
tion threshold in two circumstances. First, they may wish to stay out of the formal 
vaT if they make supplies to final consumers and much of the sale price is attribut-
able to their value added. as long as these firms are subject to input taxation only, 
their value added remains untaxed, providing an important competitive advantage 
relative to businesses in the full vaT system. These enterprises may conclude that 
higher sales will not yield greater profits if they have to reduce markup in order to 
maintain attractive pricing. Second, businesses may decide that the higher compli-
ance costs that they would incur in the vaT system would outweigh the increase in 
net profits from additional sales. The Finnish study that found output restraint to 
be the primary tactic used by enterprises to stay below the threshold suggests that 
concern over compliance costs, as opposed to increased tax liability, was the driving 
factor for this behavioural response.52 The conclusion is logical given that Finland 
has a relatively low registration threshold (approximately Cdn $12,918) and that 
compliance costs relative to turnover fall disproportionately on small businesses.
Underlying the view that restraint is a primary cause of bunching is an assump-
tion that small businesses have unlimited potential and desire for growth. however, 
 45 See, for example, Mesay M. gebresilasse and Soule Sow, Firm Response to VAT Policy: Evidence 
from Ethiopia (New York: Columbia University, august 2016).
 46 Liu and Lockwood, supra note 43, at 4.
 47 harju et al., supra note 43.
 48 Klahr et al., supra note 37.
 49 The UK government explained its reservations about the accuracy of the data based on 
telephone surveys in United Kingdom, hM Treasury, VAT Registration Threshold: Call for 
Evidence (London: hM Treasury, 2018), at 8.
 50 harju et al., supra note 43, at 32.
 51 Office of Tax Simplification, supra note 36.
 52 harju et al., supra note 43.
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the risk of economic harm may be exaggerated. Not all businesses that value the lower 
tax burden or reduced compliance costs associated with being outside the formal 
vaT will be tempted to reduce output to stay below the threshold. Businesses that 
genuinely lie below the threshold fall into three groups: (1) those that are not capable 
of further growth; (2) those that are capable of a little growth, enough to cross the 
threshold but not much more; and (3) those that are capable of ongoing growth. 
The threshold will be an inhibition only for the second group. Behaviour modifica-
tion by the first group yields no benefits, while the temporary setback of tax on 
value added and the increase in compliance costs will not outweigh the additional 
profits from continuing expansion for firms in the third group. The focus, there-
fore, is on small firms that would have limited prospects for future growth in a 
no-threshold world and that are likely to enjoy market advantages by holding back 
expansion to stay below the threshold. The efficiency losses caused by restrained 
production by these firms are unlikely to be great.
an alternative to restraint for an enterprise that is concerned that increased tax-
ation or compliance costs will offset the benefits of higher sales to final consumers 
is to continue to pursue a total turnover above the registration threshold but to 
artificially split the enterprise into smaller entities, each of which operates below 
the threshold. In some cases, splitting arrangements may extend to enterprises with 
turnovers well above the threshold. Concern over this tactic is not related to eco-
nomic costs but rather to lost revenue from final consumption that should be in the 
vaT system. Theoretical discussions of the optimal registration threshold and 
empirical studies of bunching tend to disregard splitting as a factor contributing to 
bunching.53 an exception to this observation is the Finnish study on bunching 
referred to earlier, which explicitly considered artificial splitting as a possible explan-
ation for bunching behaviour but found no clear evidence that splitting was 
significant. however, as noted above, the methodology adopted in that study to 
dismiss this avoidance tactic appears to be problematic. The study examined the 
average number of firms owned by individuals below and above the threshold on 
the assumption that split entities are owned by the same person,54 an assumption 
that appears to discount the probability of multiple-tier ownership structures or 
ownership structures between related individuals where enterprises are engaging in 
splitting arrangements.
The most convincing evidence of splitting is found in appeals documenting such 
behaviour uncovered by revenue authorities. UK cases reveal a number of tech-
niques used by taxable persons who have attempted to split the output of service 
enterprises to yield multiple turnovers below the registration threshold. One tech-
nique is to treat individual service providers within a single operation as separate 
contracted businesses (for example, characterizing hairdressers in a hairdressing 
 53 Ravi Kanbur and Michael Keen, “Thresholds, Informality, and Partitions of Compliance” 
(2014) 21:4 International Tax and Public Finance 536-59; and Liu and Lockwood, supra note 43.
 54 harju et al., supra note 43, at 30.
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salon as independent contractors).55 another is to attribute different elements of a 
service to different businesses and business owners (for example, treating a pub meal 
as separate supplies of food and drink from different related persons).56 a third 
technique is to seek to file separate registrations for different businesses operated by 
the same person (for example, attempting to register a real estate agent business 
separately from a land developer business).57 These types of avoidance arrange-
ments prompted the UK government to add to its vaT legislation a specific 
anti-avoidance provision targeting the artificial separation of business activities.58
The concern with the third tactic used to remain below the threshold, under-
reporting of sales, is also lost revenue. This behaviour clearly constitutes illegal tax 
evasion and is most likely to take place in the case of small traders making cash sales 
to final consumers who do not request invoices.59 False reporting is not limited to 
those seeking to avoid vaT registration. It may also be used by registered businesses 
(including voluntarily registered firms) seeking to mismatch full claims for inputs 
while reporting a fraction of outputs,60 and by both unregistered and registered 
firms seeking to evade vaT on sales and income tax on profits.
The implications of each of the three types of behaviour for the setting of the 
threshold differ. One view holds that, to the extent that production restraint is a 
cause of bunching, a higher threshold might be desirable.61 as the threshold increases, 
the firms that limited their output to less than the optimal level could produce a 
little more.62 a contrary view holds that the preferable response to bunching attrib-
utable to restraint is a substantial reduction in the registration threshold.63 The 
latter view assumes that businesses tempted to bunch below the current threshold 
would find it impractical to hold back production in order to operate at a signifi-
cantly lower threshold.
The hypotheses underlying both views may fail to capture fully the implications 
of the proposed changes, particularly in respect of the group of businesses that find 
 55 Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Jane Montgomery (Hair Stylists) Ltd., [1994] STC 256 (Scot. 
Ct. Ex.).
 56 Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Marner and Marner, [1977] 1 BvC 1060 (vaTTR 
Manchester).
 57 Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Glassborow and Another, [1974] QB 465 (QB).
 58 value added Tax act 1994, schedule 1, paragraph 1a (amended by Finance act 1997, c. 16, 
section 31(1)). See also alan Schenk, victor Thuronyi, and Wei Cui, Value Added Tax: A 
Comparative Approach, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), at 69.
 59 Dina Pomeranz, “No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in 
value added Tax” (2015) 105:8 American Economic Review 2539-69.
 60 Liu and Lockwood, supra note 43, at 3.
 61 Kanbur and Keen, supra note 53, at 551.
 62 Ravi Kanbur and Michael Keen, “Reducing Informality” (2015) 52:1 Finance & Development 
52-54.
 63 Office of Tax Simplification, supra note 36, at 23.
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themselves just below the new threshold. a change in the threshold level does not 
remove the temptation to bunch, but simply shifts it to a different group. If the 
threshold is raised to a level inhabited by fewer enterprises, there will be a much 
smaller pool of potential restrainers, prima facie translating to less bunching. Re-
inforcing this conclusion is the host of practical constraints that larger businesses 
contemplating restraint would face in terms of more substantial operating assets and 
a larger number of employees. Conversely, if the threshold is reduced substantially, 
the group of businesses that potentially might bunch grows exponentially, with the 
result that the absolute value of reduced output could be greater than that caused by 
restraint by far fewer firms at a much higher threshold. The sheer number of small 
firms and their dispersal through the economy may also mean that restraint could 
have a greater impact on the economy as a whole regardless of any output loss.
In respect of the restraint issue, in theory, the optimal choice of a new threshold 
will turn on a balance between potentially increased production by firms with turn-
overs just below the previous threshold and newly suppressed production by firms 
with turnovers just below the new higher or lower threshold.64 In practice, however, 
policy makers are unable to compare actual behaviour at both points. Moreover, as 
noted, the efficiency losses caused by restrained production may not be large 
enough to warrant a specific policy response in any case.
Finding an optimal threshold to discourage splitting behaviour is similarly chal-
lenging. One possibility is that a lower threshold would reduce avoidance by 
artificial splitting.65 The lower the threshold, the more a business would have to split 
to remain below the threshold. a lower threshold would raise the cost of avoidance 
by limiting the size of legitimate input-taxed businesses.66 however, whether it is 
more difficult and costly for businesses to split into multiple parts will also depend 
on a host of non-vaT considerations, including the nature of the businesses, income 
tax consolidation rules, company and securities laws, and licensing rules. For example, 
large integrated firms with central financing and management functions would find 
it difficult to split finely to slip below a low threshold. Service providers that are able 
to characterize employees as independent contractors may be indifferent to the 
number of notional enterprises that they create. It is questionable how effective a 
lower threshold would be in reducing avoidance by artificial splitting if such activities 
are strongly concentrated among small service providers, as might be the case in 
practice in light of the UK cases noted earlier.
a preferable response to splitting may be the use of a dedicated specific anti-
avoidance measure to consolidate the output of associated or closely bound 
enterprises. This approach has been adopted in Canada as well as the United King-
dom. There are, however, limits to the effectiveness of such rules since they operate 
 64 Kanbur and Keen, supra note 53, at 549.
 65 Ebrill et al., supra note 6, at 121.
 66 Ibid.
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within the definition of associated or closely bound persons. The Canadian rule,67 
for example, applies broadly to entities, but unlike other anti-avoidance rules in 
Canadian tax legislation that are relevant to associated persons, the output consoli-
dation rule appears not to apply to related individuals. The UK rule may suffer from 
a similar shortcoming. Nor will the Canadian rule apply to unrelated persons work-
ing in the same enterprise but presenting themselves as independent contractors 
who have elected to operate out of the same premises. These arrangements are 
more likely to fall within the scope of the UK rule, though its application in these 
situations is not certain. a better anti-avoidance rule would explicitly overcome the 
doubts raised by existing models.
as is the case with bunching attributable to business splitting, bunching resulting 
from turnover underreporting involves no constraints on business growth. Busi-
nesses expand or operate to capacity and simply fail to report some outputs. Thus, 
the concern with respect to this tactic to remain below the threshold is lost revenue. 
It has been suggested that responses to underreporting by businesses above the 
threshold can include raising the threshold so that evaders become legitimate input-
taxed unregistered enterprises.68 The argument assumes that the revenue lost to 
underreporters is lost in any case, so there is no revenue cost in terms of this group 
from raising the threshold to explicitly exclude these enterprises from the vaT. It 
must be recognized, however, that raising the threshold to change the status of 
underreporters will have ancillary impacts on revenue and administrative costs. While 
no revenue is lost in terms of enterprises that stayed below the lower threshold by 
underreporting, the higher threshold will have the effect of excluding a host of honest 
enterprises above the original lower threshold. any revenue loss from excluding 
these persons from the vaT will be offset to some extent by the resulting adminis-
trative and compliance cost savings. Contemporaneously, raising the threshold will 
encourage a new group of enterprises above the new threshold to become under-
reporters. This observation may be tempered by the lower proclivity of larger 
enterprises to underreport.
an alternative view aimed at identifying and pursuing underreporters calls for 
reducing the threshold so that there will be a smaller number of businesses legitim-
ately outside the vaT net, making it easier for authorities to detect those 
illegitimately below the threshold.69 however, this view is problematic in respect of 
the impact that a lower threshold might have on administrative costs. While the 
total number of businesses outside the net would be smaller, the lower threshold 
would apply to that pool of businesses selling primarily to final consumers and 
hence more likely to underreport. administrators’ workload in terms of the number 
of businesses to be investigated may increase as a result. also, there is a possibility 
that those who evaded in order to remain below the old threshold might still be 
 67 Excise Tax act, supra note 35, subsection 148(1) and section 127.
 68 Kanbur and Keen, supra note 53, at 551 and 556.
 69 Office of Tax Simplification, supra note 36, at 23.
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engaging in evasion after entering the vaT system. In that case, administrative 
resources might remain equally stretched, with responsibility for finding evaders 
below and above the threshold. administrative savings may be realized, however, if 
authorities conclude that only limited resources should be allocated to chase the 
relatively small revenue lost to evasion by the larger group of low turnover enter-
prises. at the same time, the larger cohort of registered persons in the vaT would 
increase administrative costs, although these would be offset to some extent by 
the increased revenue.
The various revenue and administrative tradeoffs encountered at different turnover 
levels are factors that should be considered as elements of the initial threshold-
setting exercise, not factors that lead to adjustments of the optimal threshold to 
address a problem of underreporting. Wherever the threshold is set, there will be 
underreporters with true turnovers above the threshold and consequent administra-
tive costs incurred to protect the integrity of the vaT. given the uncertainty over 
possible business responses to higher or lower thresholds, the best way to address 
underreporting may be to accept this as an inevitable phenomenon whatever the 
vaT registration threshold, and to direct resources to uncover underreporters and 
bring those exceeding the threshold into the vaT. Persons underreporting for vaT 
purposes are equally likely to underreport for income tax purposes. Since thresholds 
for income tax purposes are uncommon, enhanced enforcement of the income 
tax for small businesses can be used to reveal underreporters that should be regis-
tered for vaT. This route is admittedly more difficult in jurisdictions where vaT 
and income tax are administered by separate agencies, as is the case in China and 
Malaysia.
a registration threshold balancing revenue objectives and administrative and 
compliance costs is a desirable feature of an efficient and fair vaT. The bunching 
problem that it creates, and the restraint, splitting, and underreporting tactics 
adopted by enterprises to fall below the threshold, yield economic harm for wider 
society and revenue losses for the state. a number of techniques are needed to 
combat these behavioural responses. adjustment of the registration threshold has 
been suggested as one means of responding to the behaviour of businesses nearing 
the threshold. There are, however, competing views on how a registration threshold 
should be adjusted to address the different ways in which businesses might reduce 
actual or apparent turnover to avoid crossing the threshold. The contradictory 
conclusions along with the absence of empirical evidence on the extent of each type 
of behaviour make consideration of threshold responses to these issues problematic. 
a preferable approach is probably to look beyond threshold adjustment when con-
sidering these issues.
Policy makers in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom that have identified 
a bunching phenomenon but not pinpointed the behaviour that has led to bunching 
need to investigate further the means adopted to remain below the threshold before 
they can develop appropriate responses. Policy makers in jurisdictions such as 
Canada where the phenomenon itself has yet to be studied need first to conduct this 
preliminary research to ascertain the extent to which bunching is present.
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trAnsitioning regimes for smAll 
businesses shifting into the full  vAt
In the absence of any special rules, the consequences of crossing the registration 
threshold can be significant for small businesses. Compliance costs jump, and the 
burden of implicit tax built into the price of acquisitions is replaced by liability to 
remit a higher explicit tax. as noted, the increase in compliance costs and tax burden 
can lead to bunching behaviour by small businesses seeking to remain below, or to 
appear to remain below, the registration threshold. To mitigate this problem, a 
small number of vaT jurisdictions have adopted “transitioning” regimes that sub-
sidize the costs incurred by small businesses shifting into the full vaT.70
The measures are intended to remove the rationales for some of the behaviour 
that results in bunching. They will, of course, have no impact on unregistered firms 
that are nearing the registration turnover threshold and have limited prospects for 
or interest in further growth.71
The transitioning subsidies commonly take the form of a disappearing credit 
provided to businesses with turnovers that climb over the registration threshold, 
with the credit phasing out as turnover rises.72 variations of the transitioning regime 
can be found in Finland and the Netherlands. Japan had a similar regime at the time 
its consumption tax (as the Japanese vaT is known) was introduced, but the regime 
was abolished after eight years. The subsidies provided in the Japanese transitioning 
regime were particularly generous. When it commenced, the consumption tax fea-
tured a high registration threshold of ¥30 million (approximately Cdn $341,687) 
and a vanishing credit for businesses with turnovers between ¥30 million and 
¥60 million, starting with a full offset for consumption tax otherwise payable by 
enterprises with turnovers immediately above the threshold.73 as a consequence of 
 70 Institute for Fiscal Studies, supra note 21, at 91. Transitioning assistance is also found in some 
other sales tax regimes. For example, the retail sales tax (RST) in Manitoba includes a capped 
“commission” that businesses collecting the RST can retain. The cap has the effect of directing 
the commission primarily to small businesses; see Manitoba Finance, Retail Sales Tax Act 
Information Bulletin no. 004, “Information for vendors,” June 2017.
 71 Institute for Fiscal Studies, supra note 21, at 91.
 72 Ibid. an alternative regime adopted in Mexico in 2014 provides generous offsets for 
compliance costs and increased tax burdens by way of a disappearing formula, which allows 
newly registered businesses to retain a portion of vaT collected from customers sliding from 
100 percent of the tax collected in the 1st year of registration to 10 percent in the 10th year. an 
even more generous concession allowing very small businesses to retain all vaT collected for a 
decade after entering the vaT has allowed Mexico to remove the threshold entirely, although 
it remains to be seen whether other concessional measures for small businesses will be enough 
to offset the compliance costs and increased tax burden that will be incurred when small 
businesses emerge from the full subsidy period. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Taxation of SMEs in OECD and G20 Countries (Paris: OECD, 2015), at 74.
 73 The transition tax credit was calculated using the following formula: Transition tax credit = 
vaT otherwise payable × (¥60 million − annual sales)/(¥30 million).
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a high threshold and a generous offset, tax savings could be significant, and not 
surprisingly, there was a high takeup rate, with 93.3 percent of eligible registrants 
signing up for the concession when the consumption tax was adopted.74 While the 
concession may have had an impact on firms otherwise inclined to underreport 
sales,75 its most obvious impact was a loss of 88 percent of the total revenue that 
would have been gained if all taxpayers within this turnover range had been subject 
to the normal consumption tax.76 To limit the windfall gains by businesses with 
relatively larger turnovers and capabilities to comply with the consumption tax, 
Japan lowered the upper limit of the scheme from ¥60 million to ¥50 million 
two years after the introduction of the regime and finally abolished the conces-
sional regime in 1997.
a less generous regime was adopted in Finland in 2004. Under the Finnish 
system, still in effect, the vaT registration threshold remains unchanged at €8,500 
(approximately Cdn $12,918), but a disappearing transition tax credit in addition to 
the ordinary input tax credit entitlement is provided to firms with turnovers 
between €8,500 and €22,500.77 For businesses that have turnovers of less than 
€8,500 and that voluntarily register for the vaT, the transitioning regime tax credit 
equals the total vaT otherwise payable, with the result that their taxable supplies are 
essentially zero-rated. Because the credit is calculated by reference to the net vaT 
payable, the transitional credit relief does not apply to businesses that have a nega-
tive vaT liability.
The Finnish regime had very limited impact on bunching by businesses below 
the threshold.78 It also attracted surprisingly little interest from registered firms that 
were eligible for the relief, with only 31 percent of the eligible firms applying for 
the transitioning credit when the concessional regime was introduced.79 The un-
remarkable impact of the transitioning regime in Finland may be explained by the 
very limited benefit that the concession yields for eligible enterprises.80 as a result 
of a relatively low registration threshold and the relatively low level at which tran-
sitioning relief disappears, the average relief for eligible businesses that did not 
apply would have been only €617, and 10 percent of these businesses would have 
received less than €100 had they applied.81 The value of incentives compared to the 
relatively high compliance costs faced by firms entering the vaT was insufficient to 
 74 hiromitsu Ishi, The Japanese Tax System, 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
 75 William J. Turnier, “accommodating to the Small Business Problem Under a vaT” (1994) 
47:4 Tax Lawyer 963-86.
 76 Ishi, supra note 74, at 292.
 77 The tax credit is calculated using the following formula: Transition tax credit = 
vaT paid − [(turnover − €8,500) × vaT paid] / (€22,500 − €8,500).
 78 Institute for Fiscal Studies, supra note 21, at 88-89.
 79 Ibid., at 90.
 80 Ibid.
 81 Ibid.
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encourage very small unregistered businesses with limited sales to expand operations 
and lift turnover above the registration threshold.82
The Finnish and Japanese experiences illustrate the tradeoffs encountered at the 
margins of transitioning regimes. If the registration threshold is low, a transitioning 
regime is unlikely to have a significant impact on bunching, since the value of tax 
relief is low relative to the compliance cost burden faced by registered businesses. If 
the registration threshold is high, the corresponding higher value for tax relief may 
reduce bunching, but the high takeup rate by eligible registered businesses above 
the threshold may deliver windfall gains at a high cost to revenue. The risk of wind-
fall benefits is particularly acute in the case of voluntary registrants. By definition, 
these enterprises were willing to be part of the full vaT system, but as a result of the 
transitioning regime, they will retain a portion of the output tax that they collect.
It remains to be seen if transitioning regimes to reduce bunching incentives 
could yield better results in vaT systems with thresholds that lie between the two 
examples described. The challenge faced by policy makers is to determine the level 
of relief and the withdrawal formula that will achieve an optimal balance between 
providing incentives that are high enough to encourage transition to a normal vaT 
system and avoiding excessively high windfall gains to businesses that would make 
no deliberate effort to remain below the registration threshold.
simPlificAtion regimes for smAll 
businesses in  the vAt system
Both small businesses facing vaT compliance costs and vaT designers recognize the 
unfairness of the disproportionate compliance costs faced by the sector compared 
to the burden borne by large businesses. The response has been the adoption of a 
number of “simplification” systems designed to reduce the cost of compliance for 
small businesses that have moved into the vaT system. These regimes can operate in 
conjunction with a vaT threshold, applying to businesses in a defined band above 
the threshold; or, in the absence of a threshold, they can apply to all businesses with 
turnovers below the level at which it is agreed the unfairness has largely dissipated. 
Simplified regimes may have an impact on the optimal registration level if they 
operate in conjunction with a registration threshold. The optimal threshold 
balances revenue against compliance and administrative costs. The reduction of 
compliance costs for businesses with turnovers at the lower end of the vaT system 
in theory makes it possible to use a lower threshold while still balancing compliance 
costs and revenue. however, any reduction would be limited, and perhaps negated, 
by the increased administrative costs that would follow if more enterprises entered 
the vaT system. Even if the goal of reduced costs from simplified rules is not 
achieved, the professed outcome may provide a rationale for a lower threshold if 
policy makers seek to tip the balance in favour of increased revenue.
Simplified regimes or methods that are commonly used to reduce compliance 
costs borne by small businesses fall into three groups:
 82 Ibid., at 91.
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 1. less frequent filing and payments;
 2. optional cash- or payment-basis accounting (as opposed to accrual-basis 
accounting); and
 3. presumptive regimes for small businesses that approximate the vaT that 
would otherwise be paid under the normal vaT system.
Many countries use more than one of these regimes. For example, the United King-
dom uses all three regimes, while Canada uses two of the three—less frequent filing 
and payments, and a presumptive regime (known as quick method gST/hST 
accounting). a cross-country comparison of the regimes adopted in OECD and 
group of Twenty (g20) countries is presented in table 3. Each type of regime is 
described in more detail in the text that follows.
Less Frequent Filing and Payments
Many countries allow small businesses to file and remit less frequently than larger 
counterparts, often coupling the small business rules with a more frequent filing 
requirement for very large enterprises. The filing (and payment) periods available 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The United Kingdom, Canada, and australia 
use monthly, quarterly, and annual filing. The assumption that less frequent filing 
could significantly reduce compliance costs83 may, however, be exaggerated. Return 
filing often accounts for a small proportion of compliance costs. a study of compli-
ance costs in Canada shows that the actual completion of the return accounts for 
only 4 percent of the total labour effort on compliance, indicating that small busi-
nesses allocate very little time to return-filing activities.84 The costs of filing returns 
may have been largely reduced, moreover, by the availability of online filing ser-
vices. The larger costs are incurred in the process of identifying inputs and outputs to 
be inserted into the return, and this task requires a fixed amount of time and effort 
regardless of the frequency of return filing. It is likely that the total compliance 
costs remain relatively constant whether returns are filed once or four times a year.
In a worst-case scenario, less frequent filing may actually be counterproductive 
in terms of its simplification goals. In the United Kingdom, for example, quarterly 
filing is the standard option for small and medium-sized businesses (defined by 
turnover ranges), while small businesses below an annual filing turnover level can 
elect to file annually. Evidence suggests that in some cases annual return filing 
raised compliance costs because the single filing prompted poorer record keeping, 
leaving businesses struggling to assemble records required to complete one return 
covering a full year of transactions.85 as a result, many small businesses that joined 
 83 OECD, supra note 28, at 124.
 84 Plamondon & associates, supra note 14, at 46-47.
 85 United Kingdom, Office of Tax Simplification, Review of Value Added Tax: Progress Report and 
Call for Evidence (London: Office of Tax Simplification, February 2017), at 14.
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tAble 3  VAT Simplification Measures for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in 
OECD and G20 Countries, 2015
Calculation of vaT/gST 
liability accounting, payment, filing
Exemption 
thresholds
Presumptive 
tax schemes
Simplified 
input tax 
credit 
calculation 
schemes
Cash 
accounting
Reduced 
frequency 
of filing Other
argentina . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
australia . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
austria . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Belgium . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Canada . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Chile. . . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
China . . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
Czech Republic . . . . ✓ ✓
Denmark . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
Estonia . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
Finland. . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
France . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
germany . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓
greece . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
hungary. . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Iceland . . . . . . . . . . . ✓
India . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓
Luxembourg . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Netherlands . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
New Zealand . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓
Norway . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
Poland . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Portugal . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Slovak Republic . . . . ✓
Slovenia . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓
South africa . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓
Sweden. . . . . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓
Switzerland . . . . . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . ✓
United Kingdom . . . ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
United States . . . . . .
gST = goods and services tax; vaT = value-added tax.
Source: Based on data extracted from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Taxation of SMEs in OECD and G20 Countries (Paris: OECD, 2015) and updated 
and corrected by the author.
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the annual accounting scheme later moved back to standard quarterly returns.86 In 
fact, although over 90 percent of the total registrants in 2016-17 had turnovers 
eligible for annual accounting, less than 1 percent of all registered taxpayers had 
elected to join the scheme.87
an alternative rationale for using less frequent filing is to reduce administrative 
costs. With a view to reducing the total number of returns handled by the tax author-
ity,88 the Canadian law was amended to provide a default annual reporting period 
for small businesses below a specified turnover level, effective beginning in 1994, 
with the option to elect to use other reporting periods. The assignment of annual 
reporting as the default option may have contributed to the relatively high takeup 
rate of this option. By 2003-4, 36 percent of small businesses below the annual filing 
threshold were annual filers.89 The significant difference in the takeup rates of the 
annual accounting option in the United Kingdom and Canada may be attributable 
to the way in which the option is made available—that is, whether the default is a 
standard filing period with an opt-in to annual filing or the default is annual filing 
with an opt-out to other filing periods. Thus, the UK approach could be used by 
countries that are concerned about compliance costs, whereas the Canadian approach 
could be followed by countries that are concerned about administrative costs. how-
ever, the overall benefits of the less frequent filing option are uncertain given its 
potential to increase compliance costs and discourage good business management.
For small businesses that use less frequent filing, there may be a separate fiscal 
benefit if tax payments are tied to the filing of returns. Less frequent tax payments 
may provide a small cash flow benefit to qualifying taxpayers that could be seen as 
compensation for the relatively higher compliance costs faced by small businesses.90 
There has been concern, however, that small businesses tend to have difficulties in 
meeting deferred payment obligations associated with less frequent filing.91 a com-
promise solution is to allow optional less frequent filing but to require qualifying 
small businesses to make estimated advance payments with the same frequency as is 
required for other businesses.92 The annual accounting scheme in the United 
Kingdom is an example of this approach.93
 86 Ibid.
 87 hM Revenue & Customs, supra note 29, at section 2.11.
 88 Salvail, supra note 18.
 89 Canada Revenue agency, supra note 28, at table 2.
 90 OECD, supra note 72, at 112; and Cedric Sandford, “The administrative and Compliance 
Costs of the United Kingdom’s value-added Tax” (1990) 38:1 Canadian Tax Journal 1-20.
 91 alan a. Tait, Value Added Tax: International Practice and Problems (Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund, 1988), at 138-39.
 92 Turnier, supra note 75, at 984.
 93 For details, see United Kingdom, “vaT annual accounting Scheme” (www.gov.uk/vat-annual 
-accounting-scheme/overview).
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Cash Accounting
vaT systems are generally accrual based, meaning that the vaT is paid (or deducted) 
when invoices are issued (or received). In many countries, small businesses have the 
option to use a cash accounting method, accounting for vaT on the basis of pay-
ments received or made. While cash accounting is often advocated as a means of 
reducing compliance costs,94 the overriding purpose is more likely to provide cash 
flow benefits to eligible businesses. In particular, businesses that collect the pay-
ments from their customers long after the invoices are issued may benefit greatly, 
since the output tax is not due until payments are received. Cash accounting thus 
avoids vaT being paid on bad debts.
The common practice in most countries is to set a threshold based on turnover, 
with businesses below the threshold being eligible to use cash accounting. Busi-
nesses with turnovers above that threshold should account for vaT on an accrual 
basis. Concurrent cash and accrual accounting, however, creates a timing mismatch 
between input tax deduction and output tax liability when a cash-basis supplier 
makes a supply to an accrual-basis purchaser.95 The accrual-basis purchaser claims 
an immediate input credit while the cash-basis seller may defer the payment for a 
significant period of time or even indefinitely. New Zealand and australia had the 
experience that some related cash- and accrual-basis taxpayers aggressively exploited 
the timing mismatches to obtain what were effectively interest-free loans from the 
government.96 The schemes were considered avoidance arrangements and were 
attacked by tax authorities using general anti-avoidance rules (gaaRs). New Zealand 
also subsequently adopted a specific anti-avoidance rule (SaaR) to address the 
problem.97 In the United Kingdom, where the gaaR does not apply to the vaT, a 
SaaR was used to target these schemes.98 New Zealand’s experience shows that inad-
equately designed SaaRs may limit avoidance schemes but do not eliminate them.99 
It is quite possible that the cases uncovered by the australian and NZ authorities 
 94 OECD, supra note 72, at 110.
 95 New Zealand Inland Revenue and New Zealand Treasury, Options for Strengthening GST 
Neutrality in Business-to-Business Transactions (Wellington: New Zealand Inland Revenue, Policy 
advice Division, June 2008), at 29.
 96 See, for example, Ch’elle Properties (NZ) Limited v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [2007] 
NZSC 73; Education Administration Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, [2010] NZhC 663; 
and VCE and Commissioner of Taxation, [2006] aaTa 821.
 97 New Zealand, goods and Services Tax act 1985, section 19D.
 98 value added Tax Regulations 1995, regulations 58(e) and (f ). For an analysis of the australian, 
New Zealand, and UK approaches, see Yige Zu and Richard Krever, “gST Cash and accrual 
Mismatches: avoiding the avoidance” (2017) 46:4 Australian Tax Review 271-83.
 99 In Case X25, [2006] 22 NZTC 12,303 (TRa), the parties avoided a SaaR by structuring the 
transaction to fall just below the trigger threshold for the SaaR. The tax authority ultimately 
prevailed applying the gaaR.
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represent only the tip of a cash-accrual mismatch abuse iceberg. The problem is 
avoided in the first place in countries such as Canada where the gST law does not 
provide the cash accounting option.
Presumptive Input Tax Entitlement Regimes
Presumptive input tax entitlement regimes seek to simplify the calculation of vaT 
liability by removing the need to record and total input tax on all acquisitions and 
instead allowing qualifying persons to substitute a single presumptive input tax 
entitlement. Under presumptive regimes, small businesses charge vaT at regular 
rates on all taxable supplies of goods and services. a single flat rate is then applied to 
the total (vaT-inclusive) turnover to determine the amount of tax to be remitted 
to the tax authority. This amount is a proxy for the amount of net vaT that the 
enterprise would have remitted after deducting actual input tax credits from output 
tax in the ordinary vaT system. Importantly, registered customers of persons using 
the presumptive input tax entitlement system are entitled to full input tax credits, 
since they have been charged full vaT on their acquisitions. The presumptive input 
tax calculation regimes do not affect the amount of vaT imposed on supplies and 
charged to customers. Their only role is to determine the amount of net vaT remitted 
by qualifying small businesses while obviating the requirements that the businesses 
track and then total the vaT included in the price of every acquisition.
The presumptive input tax entitlement may vary across industries or sectors, and 
may reflect both the average costs incurred by enterprises in a sector and the extent 
to which acquisitions within the sector are likely to be exempt, zero-rated, or reduced-
rate supplies.100 In addition to the presumptive input tax credit entitlement 
provided through retention of a proportion of output tax collected, further explicit 
input tax credits are allowed for acquisitions of capital assets. Notable examples of 
such presumptive schemes include the flat rate scheme (FRS) in the United King-
dom and the quick method of gST/hST accounting in Canada. Both are optional 
for registered businesses below a specified turnover.
an inherent problem in any presumptive regime that determines net vaT to be 
remitted by the use of a single flat rate applied to turnover is inaccuracy in specific 
cases. The input tax credits notionally incorporated into the flat rate are based on 
averages that are by definition not accurate for most individual traders. The finer 
the group used to determine an average, the more accurate the calculation will be in 
theory. however, the finer the group, the greater the number of boundary problems 
that are created. For example, seeking to mitigate the presumed input tax inaccuracy 
problem, the United Kingdom has calculated different presumptive rates ranging 
from 4 percent to 14.5 percent for 54 categories of industries. The proliferation of 
categories creates a new level of complexity for businesses that must determine 
 100 OECD, supra note 72, at 107.
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which type of business activity they conduct when registering101 and a new set of 
policing problems for the tax authority.102 Successful challenges to the UK tax 
authority’s guidance and decisions illustrate the difficulty that revenue officials have 
in applying the law.103
Enterprises with higher than average inputs that believe that they will be unable 
to recover fully all input taxes under the industry-by-industry flat rate scheme can 
simply not opt to join the scheme. In 2016-17, only 25 percent of the taxpayers 
eligible to join the UK scheme were actually in it.104 Deciding whether or not to opt 
in is not a cost-free exercise. Eligible businesses will regularly incur internal and 
external costs to estimate vaT liabilities under both the FRS and the normal vaT 
regime before making the decision.105 at the same time, the flat rate will provide a 
tax advantage to businesses in each group that have lower than average input 
purchases. The additional compliance costs incurred by businesses to determine 
whether the “simplified” scheme prejudices or enhances their recovery of input tax 
clearly offset some of the simplification benefits that the FRS is expected to achieve.
The FRS therefore functions in practice as a concessional scheme for some busi-
nesses rather than a simplification scheme as intended. The main purpose for many 
of these businesses to enter the scheme is actually to reduce their tax liabilities. 
Subsequent to the adoption of FRS, the UK government ascertained that about 
30 percent of the businesses that used the scheme enjoyed substantial cash advan-
tages relative to the position that they would have faced under the ordinary vaT 
regime.106 The government viewed this outcome as an abuse of the FRS and con-
sequently introduced a new remittance rate to remove the benefit from service 
providers with presumed limited input costs.107 a new 16.5 percent rate then applies 
to “limited cost traders” whose expenditure on goods is less than 2 percent of their 
 101 KPMg LLP, Administrative Burdens—HMRC Measurement Project: Report by Tax Area Part 27: 
Value Added Tax (London: KPMg, March 2006).
 102 James Mirrlees, Stuart adam, Tim Besley, Richard Blundell, Stephen Bond, Robert Chote, 
Malcolm gammie, Paul Johnson, gareth Myles, and James M. Poterba, Tax by Design: The 
Mirrlees Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
 103 See, for example, Idess Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs, [2014] UKFTT 511 (TC); SLL Subsea 
Engineering Ltd. v. Revenue & Customs, [2015] UKFTT 43 (TC); and JJK Engineering Ltd. v. 
Revenue and Customs, [2016] UKFTT 615 (TC).
 104 hM Revenue & Customs, supra note 29, at section 2.10.
 105 KPMg, supra note 101, at 24.
 106 United Kingdom, hM Revenue & Customs, “Explanatory Memorandum to the value added 
Tax (amendment) Regulations 2017,” 2017 no. 295 (www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/295/
memorandum/contents).
 107 United Kingdom, hM Revenue & Customs, “Tackling aggressive abuse of the vaT Flat Rate 
Scheme—Technical Note,” December 5, 2016 (www.gov.uk/government/publications/
tackling-aggressive-abuse-of-the-vat-flat-rate-scheme-technical-note/tackling-aggressive 
-abuse-of-the-vat-flat-rate-scheme-technical-note).
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turnover. The limited cost trader test adds further complexity for businesses that 
genuinely use the scheme to save compliance costs, since it requires businesses to 
separate records of purchases of goods and services, a distinction that does not 
readily exist in a modern economy. Moreover, the test can be easily avoided by 
those that use the scheme “abusively” to achieve tax savings.108 For example, a firm 
primarily supplying services may be able to enjoy a fiscal benefit if it engages in a 
subsidiary activity of buying goods and selling them at a loss.109 The UK experience 
shows that specific anti-avoidance measures may have limited value in preventing 
businesses from benefiting from a system that is presumptive in essence. at worst, 
the measures may induce unproductive and inefficient business responses.
The initial design of the Canadian quick method may have avoided some of the 
problems experienced in the United Kingdom. Instead of calculating dozens of 
industry-specific rates, Canada has only two sets of rates, distinguishing between 
businesses that purchase goods for resale and businesses that provide services, with 
the former being allowed a higher notional input tax credit by way of a greater 
retention of output tax.110 The Canadian system thus avoids much of the complexity 
found in the UK system as a result of the need to identify each business’s specific 
industry category. however, a sharp distinction between businesses that primarily 
sell goods and those that primarily provide services may induce inefficient behav-
iour by enterprises operating near the margin, a risk noted in the United Kingdom. 
While the Canadian system may prevent excessive windfall benefits for pure service 
providers, with its broad sweep approach across all industries this system has much 
more scope for inaccuracy in respect of any given enterprise within each rate 
category.
The number of rates, to a degree, reflects a government’s perception of the 
balance between neutrality and simplicity. The quest for greater accuracy in, and 
less abuse of, the presumptive regime in the United Kingdom, for example, has had 
an impact on its effectiveness as a simplification system. Cost savings from the UK 
FRS were initially estimated to average £750 per business,111 but a later evaluation 
estimated average compliance cost savings to be only £45.112 Potential savings are 
 108 Office of Tax Simplification, supra note 85, at 11.
 109 Neil Warren, “vaT: Limited Cost Trader Category for FRS Users,” December 20, 2016 
(www.accountingweb.co.uk/tax/hmrc-policy/vat-limited-cost-trader-category-for-frs-users).
 110 a further mandatory regime applies to charities that allows them to retain 40 percent of the 
gST/hST they collect in lieu of input tax credits.
 111 United Kingdom, hM Customs and Excise, Easing the Impact of VAT: Consultation on a Flat Rate 
Scheme for Small Firms: HM Customs and Excise Summary of the Responses to the Consultation 
Document Issued in June 2001, Parliament Deposited Paper 02/956 (London: hM Customs and 
Excise, 2002).
 112 United Kingdom, hM Revenue & Customs, “vaT Flat Rate Scheme (FRS): Impact 
assessment of Changes to the Flat Rate percentages in January 2010,” December 7, 2009 
(www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2009/327/pdfs/ukia_20090327_en.pdf ).
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likely to fall even further with increased computerization of cash registers and 
accounting systems, which, as noted earlier, have greatly reduced compliance 
costs.113 however, these technological changes cannot entirely eliminate the need 
for simplification schemes. Computerized systems are useful where they can auto-
matically record tax attributes of sales or acquisitions—for example, whether 
supplies are taxable or exempt, and in the former case whether they are subject to 
standard, reduced, or zero rates—but they offer no savings where judgments are 
required, such as the apportionment of input tax credits by businesses that make 
both taxable and exempt supplies. Simplified regimes will continue to play a cost-
reduction role in these cases.114 From a tax policy perspective, the need for 
simplification regimes in these circumstances arguably reinforces the need to address 
the underlying complexity of a concession-ridden vaT.
Of the three techniques that have been used—less frequent filing and payments, 
cash-basis accounting, and presumptive input tax calculations—the first appears to 
entail the least risk of abuse or inaccurate and inappropriate outcomes. however, 
the simplification benefits of all three techniques are uncertain. Leaving political 
considerations aside, it is difficult to pursue so-called simplification regimes as a 
reform priority. If measures are necessary, less frequent filing and payments seems 
to be the best candidate of the trio for adoption.
AlternAtive  regimes for smAll 
businesses
as noted, the primary rationale for a threshold is to reduce compliance and admin-
istrative costs. Firms with turnovers below the threshold are input-taxed, meaning 
that they need not remit any tax on sales, but at the same time they are not entitled 
to claim input tax credits for their acquisitions. Subjecting small businesses to input 
taxation comes at a small revenue cost to the government but shields the firms almost 
entirely from compliance costs.
highest-income countries have universally concluded that a registration thresh-
old with input taxation of enterprises below the threshold is the preferable response 
to disproportionate compliance and administrative costs associated with very small 
businesses in a full vaT system, although there is a wide variation in their conclusion 
on the level of the optimal threshold. Commonly, these jurisdictions also adopt 
simplified rules for small businesses above the registration threshold. a handful of 
middle-income countries have instead opted to remove registration thresholds 
entirely in a bid to extend the revenue base. In some jurisdictions, particularly 
 113 See also Office of Tax Simplification, supra note 85, at 11. The adoption of a simplified regime 
has been seen as a direct outcome of the compliance challenges faced by small businesses in the 
period before widespread computerization; see L. Dana, “a goods and Services Tax (gST) 
and the Small Business Sector: Some Canadian Reflections” (1993) 52:4 Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 457-64.
 114 Office of Tax Simplification, supra note 85, at 11.
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 115 Examples of jurisdictions with a turnover tax for small businesses that is notionally 
incorporated into a vaT include China, Ethiopia, and West Bengal in India.
 116 Richard M. Bird and Pierre-Pascal gendron, The VAT in Developing and Transitional Countries 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 29.
 117 The weakness of this explanation was noted in Kanbur and Keen, supra note 62, at 52.
 118 Bird and gendron, supra note 116, at 187.
developing countries, another approach to simplification for small businesses is 
used, with the registration threshold being replaced by a turnover border that dis-
tinguishes larger businesses subject to full vaT and smaller businesses subject to an 
alternative turnover tax system. The latter is commonly described as a “simplified” 
vaT system.115
There is no doubt that compared to full vaT, a turnover tax imposed solely on 
sales without regard to input tax credits is easier from both a tax administration 
perspective and a taxpayer compliance viewpoint.116 It is equally clear, however, that 
subjecting small businesses to a turnover tax is not as simple as the alternative of 
removing the businesses from the vaT system entirely and leaving them subject to 
input taxation. Not surprisingly, other rationales are offered for the application of 
so-called simplified regimes to these firms.
a common explanation for the alternative turnover tax is to bring informal busi-
nesses into the “formal” economy, but advocates of this view offer no example of 
formality apart from formally paying higher taxes.117 In theory, tax authorities could 
pass on details of known enterprises to other authorities responsible for business 
licences or other attributes of the formal economy; in practice, however, particu-
larly in developing economies, channels for the automatic exchange of data between 
ministries are limited. It is possible that if appropriate information channels were 
established, incorporation of small businesses into the formal (taxpaying) economy 
could provide the government with a better understanding of the overall economy, 
allowing it to make more informed macroeconomic decisions. Somewhat ironically, 
many of the jurisdictions that have embraced an alternative turnover tax as a means 
of reducing informality have a relatively lower administrative capacity than those 
jurisdictions that exclude enterprises with turnovers below the vaT threshold from 
tax with the goal of a smaller taxpayer base.
a second explanation for simplified turnover tax regimes for small businesses is 
to provide these businesses with basic fiscal skills as preparation for compliance 
should they grow sufficiently to cross the full vaT border.118 The theory is that an 
introduction to simple turnover accounts can mature into more sophisticated record-
keeping skills at a later stage.
While small business turnover tax regimes appear to lack all the fundamental 
attributes of a vaT, particularly entitlement to input tax credits on acquisitions and 
the provision of tax invoices on sales, the description of these regimes as simplified 
quasi-vaT alternatives is not wholly misleading. a single low tax rate imposed on 
total turnover is notionally similar to the full rate applied to sales reduced by input 
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tax credits on acquisitions. however, the analogy between a turnover tax and an 
actual vaT is limited. Without tax invoices in hand, registered taxpayers under the 
normal vaT system who purchase from suppliers in the turnover tax system cannot 
claim input tax credits, and the turnover tax becomes a cascading non-recognizable 
cost of acquisition for enterprises in the vaT system. The cascading effect is notice-
ably higher than that encountered when small businesses are simply left outside the 
vaT but incur input taxation on acquisitions.
In some ways, the turnover tax applied to small businesses below the registration 
threshold resembles the presumptive input tax system designed for small businesses 
above the threshold. Under both regimes, the amount of tax remitted to the tax 
authority is determined by applying a reduced rate, lower than the standard vaT 
rate, to gross receipts. In the case of the presumptive input tax, the net remittance 
is presumed to reflect the application of full tax to sales and full recovery of input 
tax credits, so that a registered customer will receive a tax invoice evidencing payment 
of the full vaT. The notional netting of input tax credits against output tax is mani-
fested in a reduced remittance by the supplier to the tax authority, not in the tax 
paid by customers. In the case of the turnover tax, however, there is no presumption 
that the final price always includes a full vaT component, and the vendor is not able 
to issue a tax invoice.
In a revenue-neutral context, a lower-rate turnover tax on small businesses allows 
a government to raise the threshold at which a higher-rate vaT applies.119 This is 
because the tax collected by way of a lower-rate turnover tax applied to gross receipts 
with no recognition of input tax credits is likely to exceed the revenue that would be 
collected if these enterprises were excluded entirely from the vaT and consequently 
subject to input taxation. however, the tradeoff comes with an economic cost. To 
begin with, the non-recoverable turnover tax provides an incentive for self-supply 
that may result in less specialized and less efficient businesses.120 Concern over this 
outcome was one of the factors prompting members of the predecessor to the Euro-
pean Union to replace their turnover taxes with vaT systems.121 Equally importantly, 
the non-creditable feature of the turnover tax and the tax cascading to which this 
leads put small suppliers subject to the tax at a significant competitive disadvantage 
relative to enterprises in the full vaT system when selling to registered businesses.
conclusion
Registration thresholds and small business regimes are primarily designed to reduce 
administrative costs borne by tax authorities and compliance costs that fall on small 
businesses. Each of these features of vaT systems gives rise to concerns.
 119 Ibid., at 120.
 120 Richard Krever, “Designing and Drafting vaT Laws for africa,” in Richard Krever, ed., VAT 
in Africa (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2008), 9-28, at 10.
 121 For example, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. See henry J. aaron, ed., The Value-Added Tax: 
Lessons from Europe (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981).
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The registration threshold raises concerns because of the distinction that it 
creates between small businesses bearing lower tax and compliance burdens and 
slightly larger firms with higher liabilities and compliance costs. Businesses left 
outside the full vaT that primarily sell to final consumers will generally enjoy a 
competitive advantage from the lower tax burden and compliance costs. Those selling 
to registered enterprises will be disadvantaged, a problem that can be addressed 
through voluntary registration, albeit with implications for both revenue and admin-
istrative costs. These factors will affect the optimal registration threshold, 
particularly in countries where the voluntary registration rate is high.
These reduced tax burden and compliance costs for unregistered enterprises 
create incentives for businesses selling primarily to final consumers to stay below 
the threshold through real output changes or avoidance or evasion activities. 
Empirical studies clearly reveal business behaviour to bunch below a registration 
threshold in the jurisdictions in which this research has been conducted. They do 
not reveal the extent to which the capped turnover that leads to business bunching 
is attributed to real output changes, avoidance, or evasion—causes that may vary in 
impact across different jurisdictions depending on the nature of incentives given to 
small businesses above the threshold, relative compliance costs, and administrative 
and enforcement capacities.
views on a possible role for the registration threshold level to address unwanted 
behavioural responses are ambiguous, with different observers proposing higher or 
lower thresholds to address the same type of behaviour in some cases. Each recom-
mendation is based on assumptions regarding probable changes to business 
behaviour, a risky basis for policy development. Balancing the recommendations 
may thus be impossible, in particular where empirical studies do not provide evi-
dence on the extent of each behaviour. at the same time, it seems that concern over 
restraint as a cause of bunching may be exaggerated. In the face of uncertainty 
coupled with the availability of alternative direct policies that can be used to address 
splitting and underreporting, the best approach for policy makers appears to be to 
seek a threshold that balances revenue and compliance and administrative costs 
without regard to bunching behaviour but taking into consideration the impacts of 
voluntary registration.
a few countries have sought to minimize inefficiencies and distortions caused by 
a sharp increase in tax liability and compliance costs at the threshold by adopting a 
graduated phasing-in regime. Experience nevertheless suggests that it is difficult to 
set the correct incentives to make the regime work effectively while not providing 
excessive windfall benefits.
Wherever the vaT registration threshold is set, just above the threshold are 
enterprises relatively smaller than those further up the turnover scale. These 
smaller businesses face disproportionate compliance costs, prompting the adoption 
of simplified regimes to reduce those costs. If the simplified regimes truly led to 
reduced compliance costs, the optimal threshold level balancing costs and revenue 
might shift, subject to the constraint of greater administrative costs. Even if an 
actual reduction of costs does not materialize, as appears likely in many instances, 
346  n  canadian tax journal / revue fiscale canadienne (2018) 66:2
the nominal outcome of a simplified system may provide political cover for adoption 
of a lower threshold.
Further considerations that may affect the decision to adopt a simplified regime 
include the risks entailed in simplified systems and questions about their fairness 
and behavioural consequences. Simplified regimes that allow concurrent cash- and 
accrual-basis accounting for vaT purposes are vulnerable to avoidance schemes 
involving cash-basis sellers who may defer tax liability indefinitely while related 
accrual-basis buyers claim immediate input tax credits. Presumptive regimes 
intended to remove the need for small businesses to track input tax will approxi-
mate the impact of a vaT in respect of only a tiny number of businesses that mimic 
exactly the characteristics of the models used to calculate the notional input tax 
entitlement built into the retention formula. For all other eligible businesses, these 
regimes provide either windfalls or penalties. at the same time, separate presump-
tions for enterprises that provide different types of supplies may induce businesses 
to add particular types of supplies to or remove others from their business models.
While higher-income jurisdictions have concluded that input taxation only of 
smaller businesses below the threshold is the optimal solution to the compliance 
cost and administrative cost problems, there are some jurisdictions with no registra-
tion threshold, where the vaT is extended to all enterprises. a different approach 
adopted in some middle- and lower-income jurisdictions replaces the registration 
threshold with an alternative tax border, with a lower-rate turnover tax being imposed 
on businesses below the full vaT threshold. The turnover tax leads to cascading and 
consequent competitive disadvantages for many businesses, while encouraging 
others to adopt less efficient self-supply structures.
vaT thresholds and small business regimes are among the most difficult policy 
areas in a vaT, presumably because the evidence on the extent of problems associ-
ated with them and business responses to attempted solutions is so ambiguous. 
Subject to this caveat, however, a number of tentative conclusions can be reached. 
First, the adoption of a registration threshold is the most efficient measure to reduce 
administrative and compliance costs. a higher threshold with the option of volun-
tary registration is generally preferable to a lower threshold with concessional or 
simplified regimes for businesses above the threshold, and input taxation rather 
than alternative turnover taxation is preferable for enterprises with turnovers below 
the registration threshold. Second, where simplified rules for small businesses with 
turnovers above the registration threshold are necessary (for political reasons), the 
option for less frequent filing, possibly coupled with less frequent payments, is 
the least harmful concession available. Third, incentive schemes designed to facili-
tate the transition of small businesses into the vaT appear not to be successful. 
Distortions and inefficiencies caused by a threshold may have to be seen as a neces-
sary price to be paid for achieving administrative and compliance cost savings, at 
least before more evidence on the negative effects of a threshold is available.
What are the implications of these conclusions for Canada? Prior to the adoption 
of the federal gST, most provinces levied retail sales taxes, often with lower thresh-
olds. The shift to gST/hST in selected provinces allowed some small businesses to 
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reduce their compliance costs and lowered overall administrative costs. In the absence 
of any adjustments or indexation, the Canadian registration threshold, set in 1991, 
has fallen in real terms for 16 years, drawing an ever-higher proportion of busi-
nesses into the gST net.122 This may not be a problem. Over the same period, 
administrative capacity to collect and enforce the tax has grown, and technological 
developments have reduced compliance costs, likely softening the impact of more 
firms entering the formal gST regime. Study of the relative weighting of these 
issues will help to determine whether the enlargement of the gST net has been 
appropriate.
This balance must also be considered in light of current concessional regimes for 
small businesses. In particular, Canada’s quick method gST/hST accounting for small 
businesses may yield more problems than solutions to the compliance cost issue. 
Winding up the system and at the same time raising the registration threshold to 
remove more enterprises from the gST could generate similar or greater compli-
ance savings without the current risk of concession abuse.
In terms of the bunching issue, the implications for Canada will turn on empirical 
data that until now have not been collected. Before a full response can be developed, 
the distribution of businesses must be investigated to ascertain the extent of bunch-
ing and to identify the means used to remain below the registration threshold in 
Canada. In the absence of evidence of either the extent of or the means used to reduce 
turnover, simply continuing along the current path may do less harm than changes 
in response to unknown behaviour. a better approach, however, would be to com-
mence the research required for more reasoned long-term reform.
 122 If the real value of the threshold used in 1991 had been adjusted in line with inflation, 
registration in 2017 would have been required only for businesses with sales revenue of 
$47,334 or more.

